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1. Japaridze’s abstract resource semantics and intuitionistic logic
Sub-structural logics are often understood as logics of resources. Propositional variables mean certain types of abstract
resources (rather than assertions, as in classical logic). Each occurrence of a variable p identiﬁes one unit of a resource p. The
connectives ∧ (multiplicative AND), ∨ (multiplicative OR),  (additive AND), unionsq (additive OR), ¬ (negation), !,? (exponential
AND and OR) and 0,1 (constants) have the following meaning. The expression x∧ y means one unit of x and one unit of y
(for example, x ∧ x is two units of the resource x). The expression x  y means an obligation to provide one unit of the
resource x or one unit of the resource y where the consumer of resources (the user) makes the choice between x and y
(for example, x  x is the same as x). The formula x unionsq y means also an obligation to provide one unit of the resource x or
one unit of the resource y. However, this time the choice between x and y is made by the provider (again xunionsq x is the same
as x).
What is the interpretation of ∨ (multiplicative OR)? Let us use the following metaphor. Assume that resources are coins
of different types. Each occurrence of a variable x is regarded as a coin of type x. The coins can be genuine or fake, and the
consumer cannot distinguish between genuine and fake ones. The expression x ∨ y is understood as a pair of coins, a coin
of type x and a coin of type y, such that at least one of them is genuine (however, the user has no idea, which one).
The expression ¬x means the obligation of the user to pass to the provider one coin of type x (we can understand x
also as the obligation of the provider to pass to the user one coin of type x). The formula ! x is understood as an inﬁnite
stock of genuine coins of type x. The expression ? x means an inﬁnite stock of coins of type x such that at least one coin in
the stock is genuine (and the user does not know which one). In other words ! x is a countable version of the multiplicative
AND, x∧ x∧ x∧ . . . , and ? x is a countable version of the multiplicative OR, x∨ x∨ x∨ . . . .
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the obligation of the user.
In the next two sections we give a formal deﬁnition of a semantics which clariﬁes this intuition. From both the technical
and philosophical viewpoints, this semantics coincides with Japaridze’s “The logic of tasks” semantics deﬁned in [5] and
later extended to what has been termed abstract resource semantics in [8,11]. What we call “a coin” is called “a task” in [5]
and an “abstract resource” in [8,11]. A genuine coin is a task accomplished by the provider. A false coin is a task that the
provider failed to accomplish.
1.1. Syntax
Fix a countable set of variables x1, x2, . . . . A literal is a variable xi or a negated variable ¬xi . Formulae are obtained
from literals, constants 1,0 and connectives ∧,∨,,unionsq,?, ! in the usual way. We consider formulae where negations appear
only in front of variables. When we write ¬A, we always mean the formula dual to A, that is, the formula which is
obtained from A by changing each connective, each variable and each constant to its dual: ∨ ↔ ∧, unionsq ↔ , ! ↔ ?, ¬xi ↔ xi
and 1↔ 0.
The notion of a sub-formula of a formula A is deﬁned in a usual way. Occurrences of a sub-formula B in A will be
called oformulae. We deﬁne oliterals and ovariables in a similar way. If an ovariable is preceded by negation then it is called
negative, otherwise positive.
1.2. Semantics
Each formula is assigned a two player game [A] of perfect information. The players are called Alice and Bob. A formula
A will be called valid if Alice has a winning strategy in the game [A].
First we replace in A each oformula of the type ! B by the inﬁnite formula B ∧ B ∧ B . . . , and each oformula of the type
? B by the formula B ∨ B ∨ B . . . . It is easy to see that the order of replacements does not affect the result, which is an
inﬁnite formula of a ﬁnite depth.
In the game [A], the players make moves in turn. It does not matter who moves ﬁrst. In his turn, Bob may perform any
ﬁnite sequence a1, . . . ,ak of actions (the sequence may be empty). Each action ai has the form “choose the left formula in
B  C” or “choose the right formula in B  C”, where B  C is an oformula of A. For each oformula B  C Bob may only once
make an action “choose . . . in B  C”, that is, he is not allowed to change the choices he has made.
In her turn, Alice may also perform any ﬁnite (possibly empty) sequence of actions. Each her action has one of the
following two forms.
(1) “Choose the left (right) formula in B unionsq C” where B unionsq C is an oformula of A.
(2) “Allocate U to V ”, where U is a negative occurrence of a variable xi in A and V is a positive occurrence of the same
variable xi in A.
The informal meaning of this action is that Alice wants to accomplish her obligation V using the coin U provided by Bob.
For each positive ovariable V Alice may perform at most one action of the form U → V , and for each negative ovariable
U she may perform at most one action of the form U → V . In other words, actions of type (2) establish a matching between
positive and negative ovariables that respects variables’ names. Note that Bob is not allowed to make allocations. For each
oformula B unionsq C Alice may only once make an action of the type “choose . . . in B unionsq C”.
Each play consists of inﬁnite (countably many) number of moves. When the play is ﬁnished, we deﬁne who has won as
follows. Call a coin evaluation any mapping e from the set of all negative ovariables to the set {0,1}. The informal meaning
of a coin evaluation is the following: If e(U ) = 0 then the coin U provided by Bob is fake, otherwise (if e(U ) = 1) it is
genuine. Given a coin evaluation e, we recursively extend e to all oformulae of A. We say that B is won by Bob, if e(B) = 0,
and otherwise by Alice.
(1) If V is a positive ovariable, then e(V ) = 1, if for some negative ovariable U such that e(U ) = 1, in the course of the
play, Alice has performed an action “allocate U to V ”. The informal meaning: Alice has accomplished her obligation V
if she has allocated a genuine resource U to it.
(2) If B is an occurrence of a negative literal ¬U , then Alice has won B iff e(U ) = 0. Thus ¬ acts as a classical negation.
Rules (1) and (2) imply the following. If Alice has performed an action “allocate U to V ” then exactly one of oformulae
¬U , V is won by Alice.
(3) Alice has won an oformula B ∧ C iff she has won both B and C . She has won an oformula B ∨ C iff she has won B or C .
(4) In a similar way we deﬁne who has won occurrences of ! B and ? B: an oformula B1 ∧ B2 ∧ B3 . . . (we use subscripts
to distinguish between different occurrences of B) is won by Alice iff she has won all oformulae B1, B2, B3 . . . . An
oformula B1 ∨ B2 ∨ B3 . . . is won by Alice iff she has won at least one of oformulae B1, B2, B3 . . . .
(5) Alice has won an oformula B unionsq C iff, in the course of the play, she has decided between B and C in B unionsq C and has won
the chosen oformula. That is, she has performed the action “choose the left formula B unionsq C” and she has won B , or she
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and C then she has lost B unionsq C .
(6) For an oformula of the form B  C the deﬁnition is similar (we swap Alice and Bob). Bob has won an oformula A  B
iff in the course of the play, he has decided between B and C and has won the chosen oformula.
(7) Every occurrence of 0 is won by Bob and every occurrence of 1 is won by Alice.
Finally, we say that Alice has won the play iff for every coin evaluation e she has won the entire formula A. The informal
meaning: Alice has accomplished the obligation A whatever coins Bob has used.
There is an equivalent way to deﬁne the result of a play. Call ovariables U and V matching if Alice has allocated U to V .
Deﬁne an ovariable evaluation, as any mapping from the set of all ovariables to {0,1}. Call e correct if e(U ) = e(V ) whenever
U matches V . Alice has won a play if for every ovariable evaluation she has won the formula A according to the above rules
(2)–(7). Indeed, the worst (for Alice) correct ovariable evaluation satisﬁes item (1) above anyway and thus can be identiﬁed
by a coin evaluation.
In other words, to ﬁnd who has won a play make the following steps. Replace by 0 all the oformulae of type B unionsq C
such that Alice has not chosen B or C . Replace by 1 all the oformulae B  C where Bob has not decided between B
and C . Replace each remaining occurrence of a formula of the form B unionsq C or B  C by the chosen subformula. (The order
of replacements does not affect the result.) Then replace each ovariable by a new variable in such a way that matching
ovariables are replaced by the same variables and non-matching ones by different ones. The resulting formula is an inﬁnite
formula of ﬁnite depth with connectives ¬,∨,∧ and constants 1,0. Alice has won the play iff this formula is a classical
tautology (where ∧ is understood as AND, ∨ as OR, and ¬x as the negation of x). The above described transformation is
what is called elementarization in [5,6,13].
Here is an example of play.
1. Initial position: ((¬x∧ x) unionsq y) ∨ ((x∨ ¬x)  ¬y).
2. Bob chooses the left formula in (¬x∧ x) unionsq y. The resulting position is (¬x ∧ x) ∨ ((x ∨ ¬x)  ¬y) (we have deleted the
unchosen formula).
3. Alice chooses the left formula in (¬x∧ x)unionsq y. The resulting position is (¬x∧ x)∨ (x∨¬x) (we have deleted the unchosen
formula).
4. Alice allocates the ﬁrst negative occurrence of x to the second positive occurrence of x. The resulting position is
(¬x1 ∧ x) ∨ (x1 ∨ ¬x) (we have used subscripts to identify allocated ovariables).
5. Alice allocates the second negative occurrence of x to the ﬁrst positive occurrence of x. The resulting position is
(¬x1 ∧ x2) ∨ (x1 ∨ ¬x2).
6. Then the players make inﬁnitely many passes.
Alice has won, as after elementarization we obtain a classical tautology (¬x1 ∧ x2) ∨ (x1 ∨ ¬x2).
The deﬁnition of the game [A] is completed. We call a formula A accomplishable2 if Alice has a winning strategy in the
game [A]. We call a formula A computably accomplishable if Alice has a computable winning strategy in the game [A]. The
simplest accomplishable formula is x∨ ¬x: in order to win Alice just allocates the second x to the ﬁrst x.
If A has no exponential connectives then the game [A] is essentially ﬁnite (every player can perform only ﬁnitely many
actions) and thus the game [A] is accomplishable iff it is computably accomplishable. In this case at least one of the
players has a (computable) winning strategy. In the general case it is unknown whether accomplishability is equivalent to
computable accomplishability.
Remark. It is important that Alice cannot distinguish fake and genuine coins. (Formally, that means that we choose a coin
evaluation after the play is ﬁnished.) For example, the formula A = (¬x ∧ ¬x) ∨ x is not accomplishable. In the game [A]
Alice has essentially two strategies: (1) she uses the ﬁrst of Bob’s coins (allocates the ﬁrst x to the third x) (2) she uses the
second one. Both strategies do not win. Indeed, if only one coin is genuine, namely, the coin that has not been allocated,
Alice has lost the formula A.
The deﬁnition of an accomplishable formula is very robust: we can change the deﬁnition of the game in many ways so
that the class of (computably) accomplishable formulae does not change. Below we present several such modiﬁcations.
1. We may forbid Alice (or Bob, or both) to perform several actions in one move. Indeed, postponing actions never hurts
the player. By the same reason it does not matter who starts the play.3
2. We may ban all actions inside oformulae B and C belonging to an oformula B unionsq C (respectively, B  C ) such that a
choice action has not yet been applied to B unionsq C (respectively, B  C ).
2 We use here the terminology of [5].
3 The games having that property are called static, see e.g. [6]. We will consider other static games in the next section.
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false, but Alice does not know that decision. In this case the game [A] becomes a game of imperfect information. This
change decreases Bob’s power and there are formulae A for which Bob has a winning strategy in the game [A] before
the change and has no winning strategy in [A] after the change. This happens, say, for the formula (¬x ∧ ¬x) ∨ x. The
notion of accomplishability however does not change, as it is deﬁned through Alice’s strategies and not Bob’s ones.
4. We can deﬁne the game [A] recursively. To this end we need a notion of a “game with coins” and operations on such
games that correspond to connectives.
Games of the form [A] can be regarded as vending machines: negative ovariables can be identiﬁed with slots for coins and
positive ovariables with compartments for releasing the products. For instance, a vending machine that accepts 1 Euro coin
and 50 cents coins and sells coffee and tea, for 1 Euro each, can be represented by the formula
!(¬(1 Euro unionsq (50 cents∧ 50 cents)) ∨ (tea  coffee)).
Informally, the game [A] is accomplishable iff the vending machine can work without having any resources in advance.
Remark. The calculus CL2 found in [8] provides a sound and complete axiomatisation for the set of all accomplishable for-
mulae that have no exponential connectives. It is unknown whether the entire set of accomplishable formulae is computably
enumerable. The similar question is open for computably accomplishable formulae, too.
1.3. Accomplishable formulae and aﬃne logic
Girard’s aﬃne logic [4] is a useful tool to prove accomplishability of many formulae. Consider the following its variant.
A sequent is a ﬁnite list of formulae. A sequent consisting of formulae A1, . . . , An is denoted by 
 A1, . . . , An . The order of
formulae in a sequent does not matter, but the multiplicity of each formula matters. That is, 
 p, p and 
 p are different
sequents. A sequent 
 A consisting of a single formula A is identiﬁed with the formula A.
Axioms: 
 A,¬A, 
 1.
Derivation rules:

 Γ, A 
 ,¬A

 Γ, (Cut).

 Γ, A 
 , B

 Γ,, (A ∧ B) (Introducing ∧).

 Γ, A, B

 Γ, (A ∨ B) (Introducing ∨).

 Γ, A 
 Γ, B

 Γ, (A  B) (Introducing ).

 Γ, A

 Γ, (A unionsq B) ,

 Γ, B

 Γ, (A unionsq B) (Introducing unionsq).

 Γ

 Γ, A (Weakening).

 Γ, A

 Γ,? A (Dereliction).

 Γ,? A,? A

 Γ,? A (Contraction).

 ?Γ, A

 ?Γ, ! A (R).
Here ?Γ denotes the list obtained from Γ by preﬁxing by ? all formulae in the list.
Call the formula A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An the formula image of the sequent 
 A1, . . . , An . If the list is empty (that is, n = 0), its
formula image is equal to 0. A sequent is called (computably) accomplishable if so is its formula image.
Theorem 1. The set of accomplishable sequents contains all axioms of the aﬃne logic and is closed under all its derivation rules. The
same applies to computable accomplishable sequents. (Hence all derivable formulae are computably accomplishable.)
Proof. Axioms: The second axiom is accomplishable by deﬁnition. We need to show that the ﬁrst one is accomplishable
as well. To this end we have to construct Alice’s computable winning strategy in the game [A ∨ ¬A]. Alice can win the
game [A ∨ ¬A] by merely mimicking Bob’s moves. More speciﬁcally, there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between
ovariables of A and ¬A. We call corresponding ovariables dual. If U is a positive ovariable then its dual is negative, and vice
versa. Alice allocates every negative ovariable in A ∨ ¬A to its dual ovariable. This is done in such a way that at the end
of the game all the allocations have been made (say one allocation per move). Every occurrence of unionsq (respectively, ) in
A ∨ ¬A is naturally assigned the “dual” occurrence of  (respectively, unionsq) in A ∨ ¬A. If Bob makes a choice in an oformula
B  C then Alice (say, on the next move) makes the same choice in the dual oformula ¬B unionsq ¬C . This strategy guarantees
that for every ovariable evaluation Alice wins exactly one of the formulae A,¬A and hence the entire formula A ∨ ¬A.
Cut: Assume that both formulae A ∨ B and ¬A ∨ C are accomplishable. Fix Alice’s strategies S, T that win the games
[A ∨ B] and [¬A ∨ C], respectively. We will deﬁne Alice’s strategy winning the game [B ∨ C].
Roughly speaking, Alice plays the games [B ∨ A] and [¬A∨ C] simultaneously, using strategies S and T . The moves made
by S, T inside B,C are made in the real game [B ∨ C], and the moves inside A and ¬A are made on the imaginary play-
board A, where the strategies S, T play against each other. That is, the strategy S considers the moves made by T in the
game [¬A], as Bob’s moves in the game A, and conversely the strategy T considers the moves made by S in the game [A],
as Bob’s moves in the game [¬A].
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not hard to see that the notion of accomplishability does not change, if we change the rules of the game as follows. Bob is
allowed in his turn to make an action “deposit a coin in U ” where U is a positive ovariable, and Alice is allowed to make
an allocation U → V only after Bob has deposited a coin in U (that is, U is “non-empty”). Bob deﬁnes e(U ) immediately,
when he deposits a coin in U (but Alice does not know e(U )). We will say that Bob has deposited a genuine coin in U if
e(U ) = 1. If Bob has never deposited a coin into U then e(U ) = 0. The result of the play is deﬁned as earlier using the coin
evaluation deﬁned in this way. In this proof we will use these rules. We will imagine that Bob makes a move “deposit a
coin in U ” by putting a real coin onto U and Alice allocates U to V by moving this coin to V . The position in the play is
speciﬁed by the choices made by the players and locations of the coins, where for each coin sitting on a positive ovariable
its previous location is speciﬁed.
Alice’s strategy: Alice splits the current position b ∨ c in the game [B ∨ C] into positions b and c. She also keeps an
imaginary position a in the game A. In her turn, she ﬁrst applies the strategy S to the position b ∨ a in the game [B ∨ A]
and obtains a new position b′ ∨ a′ . She then applies the strategy T to the position ¬a′ ∨ c and obtains a position ¬a′′ ∨ c′ .
Here ¬a′ represents the position in the game ¬A obtained from a′ by changing all connectives to their duals, changing p
into ¬p and ¬p into p for all oliterals. The resulting position in the game [B ∨ C] is b′ ∨ c′ and the resulting imaginary
position is a′′ .
This description has an important drawback. What happens when S moves a coin from b to a, that is, from a negative
ovariable U in B to a positive ovariable V in A, or in the other direction, from a negative ovariable V in A to a positive
ovariable U in B? In the ﬁrst case Alice moves the coin into the “temporary store” (later she will probably decide on which
ovariable to put it). The locations in the temporary store correspond to ovariables in A. In the second case Alice takes the
coin from the location U in the temporary store and puts it on V . Alice acts similarly when T moves coins from C to ¬A
or in the other direction. When S (respectively, T ) moves a coin within A (respectively, ¬A), Alice moves that coin within
the temporary store.
Thus Alice uses the “temporary store” while playing [B ∨ C]. It is clear that this does not increase her power. Indeed,
instead of putting a coin into the temporary store she can wait until the coin will be taken back from the store. If the coin
is never taken back, the coin is not moved at all from its original location.
We have to prove that this strategy wins. Let b ∨ c be the ﬁnal position in the game [B ∨ C] and a the ﬁnal position in
the imaginary play. As S is a winning strategy, Alice has won b or a. In the ﬁrst case we are done. Otherwise the strategy
S has won the imaginary play, hence the strategy T has lost it. As T is a winning strategy, it has won c.
Introducing ∧: We (that is, Alice) are given strategies winning the games [A ∨ C] and [B ∨ D] and have to design a
strategy winning the game [A ∨ B ∨ (C ∧ D)]. We just apply the strategies independently. If the ﬁrst strategy has won the
formula A or the second strategy has won B , we are done. Otherwise the ﬁrst strategy has won C and the second strategy
has won D hence we have won the formula C ∧ D .
Introducing ∨: For this rule the formula image of the upper sequent coincides with the formula image of the lower
sequent. Thus we have nothing to prove.
Introducing : We (Alice) are given strategies to win the games [A ∨ B] and [A ∨ C]. We have to design a strategy to win
the game [A ∨ (B  C)]. We do not do anything until Bob makes a choice in the formula B  C . If that never happens, we
have won. Otherwise we apply the ﬁrst strategy, if Bob has chosen B and we apply the second strategy otherwise.
The ﬁrst rule of Introducing unionsq: We (Alice) are given strategy that wins [A ∨ B]. To win [A ∨ (B unionsq C)] we ﬁrst choose B and
then apply the given strategy. For the second rule the arguments are similar.
Weakening, Dereliction and Contraction: straightforward.
R: We (Alice) are given a strategy S that wins the game [? A1 ∨· · ·∨? An ∨ B]. Consider the game [!(? A1 ∨· · ·∨? An ∨ B)].
We can win this game by applying the strategy S ′ that consists of countable number of independent copies of S . A slight
modiﬁcation S ′′ of S ′ wins the game [? A1∨· · ·∨? An ∨! B]. Let us deﬁne S ′′ . For each i, both formulas !(? A1∨· · ·∨? An ∨ B)
and ? A1 ∨ · · · ∨ ? An ∨ ! B have countably many occurrences of Ai . Put them into a one-to-one correspondence, and let (A ji )′
denote the occurrence that corresponds to A ji . Put also occurrences of B into a one-to-one correspondence. If S
′ makes a
move that involves A ji or B
j then S ′′ makes a similar move using (A ji )
′ or (B j)′ instead. Let us show that S ′′ wins. Run S ′′
and S ′ in parallel against the same adversary (that is, we mimic in the game [!(? A1 ∨ · · · ∨ ? An ∨ B)] all the moves made
by a real adversary playing the game [? A1 ∨ · · · ∨ ? An ∨ ! B]). Then for every j, i, the strategy S ′ has won A ji if and only
if S ′′ has won (A ji )
′ , and the same applies to B j . If S ′ has won B j for all j, then S ′′ has won (B j)′ for all j and hence
has won the entire formula. Otherwise, S ′ has won at least one of A ji (even inﬁnitely many of them), thus S
′′ has won
? A1 ∨ · · · ∨ ? An . 
The aﬃne logic is not complete with respect to the abstract resource semantics. An example of an accomplishable non-
provable formula is
[
(¬a ∨ ¬b) ∧ (¬c ∨ ¬d)] ∨ [(a ∨ c) ∧ (b ∨ d)].
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to [15], where the reader can ﬁnd a complete game semantics for the linear logic and references to other game semantics
that are better tailored for the aﬃne or linear logic.
We conclude this section by showing that the set of accomplishable formulae is closed under the substitution. We will
need this later.
Theorem 2. Assume that a formula A′ is obtained from an accomplishable formula A by substituting a formula B for all occurrences
of a variable p. Then A′ is accomplishable.
Proof. Fix Alice’s winning strategy S in the game [A]. We will play [A′] (in Alice’s part) as follows. While playing [A′] we
simultaneously play an imaginary game [A], where we apply the strategy S . We copy to the real game all the choices and
allocations made by S in the imaginary game except allocations involving the variable p. We also copy to the imaginary
game [A] all Bob’s choices made in the real game [A′] outside occurrences of B . If in the imaginary play the strategy S
allocates an occurrence U of p to an occurrence V of p, we declare the corresponding occurrences of B symmetrical. All
pairs of symmetrical occurrences are synchronised: we mimic all Bob’s choices made inside one of these occurrences in the
other one. Notice that U is positive and V is negative, therefore we are able to do that. Besides, we allocate every negative
ovariable in either of these occurrences to the dual positive ovariable in the other occurrence.
Let us prove that this strategy wins. Let e′ be an ovariable evaluation in the game [A′]. Drop the values of e′ on all the
ovariables from the occurrences of B . The resulting mapping e evaluates all the ovariables of A except for p. Extend e to
occurrences of p as follows: e(U ) = 1 iff, in the play [A′], Alice4 has won the oformula U ′ (the occurrence of B obtained
by substituting B for U ). The deﬁned evaluation respects matchings. Indeed, if U has been allocated to V then we have
synchronised U ′ and V ′ and hence the results of U ′ and V ′ coincide. It is easy to show by induction that, for this pair of
evaluations, the result of the imaginary game coincides with the result of the real play. Since S is a winning strategy, we
have won A and hence A′ . 
1.4. Accomplishable formulae and the intuitionistic propositional calculus IPC
Consider the Girard’s translation from the language of propositional formulae with connectives ∧,∨,→,⊥ into the
language of aﬃne logic. Each formula A is assigned a formula A∗ deﬁned recursively: (xi)∗ = xi and
(A ∨ B)∗ = ! A∗ unionsq ! B∗, (A ∧ B)∗ = A∗  B∗,
(A → B)∗ = ¬(! A∗) ∨ B∗ = ?(¬A∗) ∨ B∗, ⊥∗ = 0.
This translation preserves provability. The next lemma shows that the combination of this translation and abstract
resource semantics yields a sound semantics for the intuitionistic calculus. Call an intuitionistic formula (computably) ac-
complishable if its translation is (computably) accomplishable.
Lemma 3. The set L of accomplishable intuitionistic formulae is a super-intuitionistic logic (that is, L contains all axioms of IPC and is
closed under Modus Ponens and substitution). The same holds for the set of all computably accomplishable intuitionistic formulae.
Proof. 1. The translations of all axioms of IPC are derivable in the aﬃne logic [4] and all derivable formulae are accomplish-
able by Theorem 1. Hence L contains all axioms of IPC.
2. Let A and B be intuitionistic formulae such that A∗ and (A → B)∗ are accomplishable. We have to prove that B∗ is
accomplishable, too. As A∗ is accomplishable, the formula ! A∗ is accomplishable as well. The formula B∗ can be obtained
from ¬! A∗ ∨ B∗ and ! A∗ by applying Cut. Hence B∗ is accomplishable by Theorem 1.
3. L is closed under substitution by Theorem 2. 
Remark. If we deﬁned the translation of A ∨ B as just A∗ unionsq B∗ then the translation of the axiom
(x → z) → ((y → z) → (x∨ y → z))
would not be accomplishable.
It turns out that this semantics of IPC is complete for the positive fragment of IPC.
Theorem 4. If A is a positive intuitionistic formula (that is, A does not contain ⊥) and A∗ is accomplishable then A is derivable in IPC.
4 More precisely, the player who has played U ′ in Alice’s part.
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(without a complete proof) and proved in [3]. A critical implication is a (positive) formula of intuitionistic language of the
form A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am → R , where R is an OR of variables and each Ai has the form (Pi → Q i) → Q i . Here every Pi is an
AND of variables, every Q i is an OR of variables, and, for all i, the formulae Pi and Q i have disjoint sets of variables. The
number of variables in R , Pi and Q i is positive and may be equal to 1.
Theorem 5. (See [3,14].) If a super-intuitionistic logic contains no critical implication then its positive fragment coincides with the
positive fragment of IPC.
Proof of Theorem 4. We have seen (Lemma 3) that the set of accomplishable intuitionistic formulae is a super-intuitionistic
logic. Thus by Theorem 5 it suﬃces to prove that every critical implication is not accomplishable. Let us show this ﬁrst for
a very simple critical implication
A = ((x → y) → y) ∧ ((y → x) → x) → x∨ y
whose translation is
A∗ = ?[(!(?¬x∨ y) ∧ ¬y) unionsq (!(?¬y ∨ x) ∧ ¬x)] ∨ (! x unionsq ! y)
From Bob’s viewpoint the game [A∗] is simpler than the game [B], where B is obtained from A∗ by dropping all exponential
ANDs:
B = ?[((?¬x∨ y) ∧ ¬y) unionsq ((?¬y ∨ x) ∧ ¬x)] ∨ (x unionsq y).
We will present Bob’s winning strategy in the game [B]. In this game he cannot make any actions, thus we need to prove
that Bob wins the play whatever actions performs Alice. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: Alice has not made any choice in the formula xunionsq y. Then she has lost the entire formula, if all x’s and all y’s are
true. Indeed, Bob has won the formula xunionsq y. Moreover, he has won all oformulae (?¬x∨ y)∧¬y and (?¬y∨ x)∧¬x, since
he has won all occurrences of ¬x and ¬y.
Case 2: Alice has made a choice in x unionsq y. Assume that she has chosen x (the other case is similar). Then she has
lost the entire formula, if all x’s are false and all y’s are true. Indeed, Bob has won the formula x unionsq y and all oformulae
(?¬x∨ y) ∧ ¬y, as he has won ¬y. Besides, Bob has won all oformulae (?¬y ∨ x) ∧ ¬x, as he has won ?¬y ∨ x.
Consider now the general case. Let A = A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am → R be a critical implication where Ai has the form
Ai = (Pi → Q i) → Q i and R = x1 ∨ · · · ∨ xn where n  2 (w.l.o.g. we may assume that R is an OR of all variables). The
translation of A is A∗ = ?(¬A∗1 unionsq · · · unionsq ¬A∗m) ∨ R∗ where
¬A∗i = !
(
?¬P∗i ∨ Q ∗i
) ∧ ¬Q ∗i
and R∗ = ! x1 unionsq · · · unionsq ! xn . Drop the operation ! in all the formulae !(?¬P∗i ∨ Q ∗i ) and in the formula ! x1 unionsq · · · unionsq ! xn . The
resulting formulae ?¬P∗i ∨ Q ∗i and x1 unionsq · · · unionsq xn are harder for Bob. Thus it suﬃces to construct Bob’s winning strategy for
the game [B] where
B = ((?¬P∗1 ∨ Q ∗1
) ∧ ¬Q ∗1
) ∨ · · · ∨ ((?¬P∗m ∨ Q ∗m
) ∧ ¬Q ∗m
) ∨ (x1 unionsq · · · unionsq xn).
Recall that Pi is an AND of variables and Q i is an OR of variables. Thus while playing [B] Bob is allowed to make choices
in oformulae ¬Q ∗i for all i such that Q i has at least two variables. Fix any such oformula (?¬P∗i ∨ Q ∗i ) ∧ ¬Q ∗i . Bob makes
a choice in ¬Q ∗i in either of the following two cases: (1) Alice has made a choice in the oformula Q ∗i . In this case, on his
next move, Bob mimics Alice’s choice in ¬Q ∗i (unless he has already made the choice). (2) Alice has made a choice, say x j ,
in the formula x1 unionsq · · · unionsq xn . Then, on his next move, Bob chooses in ¬Q ∗i any variable different from x j (unless he has made
the choice earlier).
We will show now that Bob wins. To this end deﬁne a correct ovariable evaluation as follows. If Alice has not made a
choice in x1 unionsq · · · unionsq xn then declare all ovariables true. Otherwise let x j be the chosen ovariable; declare all occurrences of
x j false and all other ovariables true.
We have to prove that Bob has won the entire formula B . Consider the ﬁrst case: Alice has not made a choice in
x1 unionsq · · · unionsq xn and all ovariables are true. In this case Bob has won the formula x1 unionsq · · · unionsq xn . We have to prove that for all i he
has won every occurrence of (?¬P∗i ∨ Q ∗i ) ∧ ¬Q ∗i . Fix i and an occurrence of this formula. Bob has won all occurrences of¬P∗i thus he has won ?¬P∗i . As Bob has not made any choice according to item (2), he has mimicked Alice’s choice in Q ∗i
(provided there was any). Therefore he has won exactly one of the oformulae Q ∗i and ¬Q ∗i and hence the entire oformula
(?¬P∗i ∨ Q ∗i ) ∧ ¬Q ∗i .
In the second case Alice has chosen x j in x1 unionsq · · · unionsq xn , all ovariables x j are false, and all other ovariables are true. Again
Bob has won x1 unionsq · · · unionsq xn . We have to show that he has won all occurrences of (?¬P∗i ∨ Q ∗i ) ∧ ¬Q ∗i . Fix any of them and
distinguish the following two cases: (1) Alice has chosen the variable x j in an oformula ¬P∗i . In this case she has won ?¬P∗i
and we need to prove that Bob has won ¬Q ∗ . Bob has chosen some ovariable in ¬Q ∗ using either option (1), or option (2).i i
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As Pi and Q i have disjoint sets of variables, x j does not occur in Q i and thus he has chosen an ovariable different from
x j any way. Hence he has won ¬Q ∗i . (2) For every oformula ¬P∗i Alice has not chosen x j in it. In this case Bob has won
?¬P∗i . If he has won Q ∗i , we are done. Otherwise Q i has a variable different from x j and Alice has chosen such variable in
Q ∗i . Bob either has mimicked Alice’s choice, or has chosen in ¬Q ∗i a variable different from x j by himself. Anyway he has
won ¬Q ∗i . 
Theorem 4 does not generalise to negative formulae. We know two examples of a formula A such that A∗ is accomplish-
able but A is not provable in IPC: Rose formula from [17] and Japaridze’s formula from [7]. The latter one is simple enough
to present it here:
(¬p → x∨ y) ∧ (¬¬p → x∨ y) → (¬p → x) ∨ (¬p → y) ∨ (¬¬p → x) ∨ (¬¬p → y). (1)
Here ¬B is an abbreviation for B → ⊥.
Theorem 6. The formula (1) is accomplishable but not derivable in IPC.
Proof. The counter Kripke model is shown in Fig. 1.
It remains to prove that (1) is accomplishable. We will prove that a more general formula A = B → C where
B = (¬p → x∨ y) ∧ (¬¬p → u ∨ v),
C = (¬p → x) ∨ (¬p → y) ∨ (¬¬p → u) ∨ (¬¬p → v),
is accomplishable.
The translation of A is equal to A∗ = ?¬B∗ ∨ C∗ where
¬B∗ = (!(¬p)∗ ∧ (¬! x  ¬! y)) unionsq (!(¬¬p)∗ ∧ (¬!u  ¬! v)).
We will construct Alice’s winning strategy in the game [? D ∨ C∗] which is even harder for her, where
D = (!(¬p)∗ ∧ (¬x  ¬y)) unionsq (!(¬¬p)∗ ∧ (¬u  ¬v))
is obtained from ¬B∗ by dropping ! in front of x, y,u, v . In the course of the play we call an occurrence of ¬x  ¬y in
? D ∨ C∗ active if it is located inside an occurrence of D such that Alice has chosen the left formula !(¬p)∗ ∧ (¬x  ¬y) in
that occurrence. In a similar way we deﬁne active occurrences of ¬u  ¬v . Alice does not make any choice in the formula
C∗ until Bob has made a choice in some of active occurrences of ¬x  ¬y, ¬u  ¬v . This means that, until that moment,
Alice and Bob are playing the game
[
?
((!(¬p)∗ ∧ 1) unionsq (!(¬¬p)∗ ∧ 1)) ∨ 0] = [((¬p → ⊥) ∧ (¬¬p → ⊥) → ⊥)∗].
As the formula deﬁning this game is derivable in IPC, Theorem 3 implies that Alice has a winning strategy in this game.
Alice plays according to this strategy until Bob has made a choice in some of active occurrences of ¬x  ¬y, ¬u  ¬v .
Assume that Bob has made choice in an active occurrence of ¬x  ¬y or an occurrence where he had made the choice
earlier has become active (the case of ¬u  ¬v is similar). Once that has happened, Alice changes her behaviour. Assume
that Bob has chosen ¬x (the other case is similar). Alice then “forgets” all the other occurrences of !(¬p)∗ ∧ (¬x  ¬y) and
all the occurrences of !(¬¬p)∗ ∧ (¬u ¬v) and chooses (¬p → x)∗ in C∗ . That is, starting from that moment Alice and Bob
play the game [¬(¬p → x)∗ ∨ (¬p → x)∗]. The formula deﬁning this game is accomplishable being an axiom of aﬃne logic.
Unfortunately Alice cannot immediately use the strategy winning this game, as some moves might have been already made
inside occurrences of ¬p in
¬(¬p → x)∗ = !(¬p)∗ ∧ ¬x = !?¬p ∧ ¬x.
However it easy to overcome this problem. An inﬁnite number of occurrences of ¬p in every occurrence of ?¬p have not
been yet allocated by Alice. Therefore the current position in the game ¬(¬p → x)∗ is not worse for Alice than the initial
position. 
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2.1. Static games
We will use a rather general notion of games from [6,13] between two players, called Environment and Machine.
A move is a string over the keyboard alphabet. A labelled move (labmove) is a move preﬁxed by E or M (the preﬁx indicates
who has done the move, Environment or Machine). A run is a ﬁnite or inﬁnite sequence of labmoves. A position is a ﬁnite
run.
A game5 is speciﬁed by a set of runs L and a function W mapping runs to the set {E,M}. All runs in L are called legal,
all other runs are called illegal. If W (Γ ) = P , we say that the run Γ is won by P . Otherwise it is lost by P .
The set L must have the following properties: (1) the empty sequence (called the initial position) belongs to L and (2) if
a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) run Γ is in L then all its ﬁnite preﬁxes are in L too.
Let Γ = α1,α2, . . . be a run and αi a labmove in that run. We say that αi is the ﬁrst ﬁrst illegal labmove in Γ if
α1, . . . ,αi−1 is legal run but α1, . . . ,αi is not. Each illegal run Γ has exactly one ﬁrst illegal labmove. The function W must
have the following property: every illegal run is lost by that Player who has made the ﬁrst illegal move in it.
We have not yet deﬁned how to play a game. It is not obvious since in some positions both players can make a legal
move and the rules do not specify who has the turn to play in such a position.
There are eight ways to play a game. We have to make three choices: who starts the game, how many moves (at most
one or several) is Environment allowed to make in its turn, and how many moves (at most one or several) is Machine
allowed to make in its turn. For example, the game can be played as follows: Environment starts the play; in its turn, each
player either makes a move or passes. Another way: Machine starts the play; in its turn, Environment can make any ﬁnite
sequence of moves (including the empty sequence); in its turn, Machine can make a move or pass. For all eight ways to
play the game, we assume that the play lasts inﬁnitely long and the turn to play alternates.
For certain games it is crucial which of the eight modes to play is chosen (for example, if W (Π) = E if Π starts with
a move of E and W (Π) = M otherwise). There are however two important classes of games, strict games and more general
static games, for which it does not matter.
A game is called strict if for every legal position  at most one player can make a move α so that the resulting position
(,α) is legal. Most games considered in the literature are strict ones. However, the operations on games we are going
to deﬁne do not look natural when applied to strict games. They look natural when applied to more general static games
deﬁned in the next two paragraphs. Informally, static games are those games in which it never hurts the player to postpone
moves.
Let Γ, be (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) runs. We say that  is a Machine-delay of Γ if  is obtained from Γ by postponing
certain Machine’s moves (may be inﬁnitely many). Formally, the following conditions should hold. (1) Erasing all moves of
Environment in Γ and  results in the same run; the same holds for erasing Machine’s moves. (2) For all k and l if kth
move of Machine is made later than lth move of Environment in Γ then so is in .
We deﬁne a notion of Environment-delay in a similar way. We say that the game is static if the following holds for every
player P , every run Γ and every P -delay  of Γ . (1) If P has not made the ﬁrst illegal move in Γ then P has not made
the ﬁrst illegal move in  either. (2) If Γ is won by P then so is .
We call a static game winnable if Machine has a winning strategy in the game. It does not matter which of the above
eight ways to play the game to choose: the class of winnable static games is robust under switching between the eight
playing modes. However, it is important that we do not force any player to make a move in its turn. We call a static game
computably winnable if Machine has a computable winning strategy in the game (that is, there is a Turing machine that wins
the game).
Now we will deﬁne operations ¬,∧,∨,unionsq,,∧| ,∨| on games. Those operation will preserve static property. We will then
call a formula with connectives ¬,∧,∨,unionsq,,∧| ,∨| winnable if every substitution of static games for variables results in a
winnable game. It happens that a formula is winnable iff it is accomplishable.
2.2. Operations on games
The operation of negation ¬ just swaps the roles of players: Machine plays in Environment’s part and vice versa. The set
of legal runs of ¬A is obtained from that of A by replacing each run Γ by its dual run ¬Γ , which is obtained from Γ by
exchanging labels E and M in all labmoves. Machine wins a run Γ in ¬A iff the dual run ¬Γ is won by Environment in A:
W¬A(Γ ) = ¬WA(¬Γ ) (where ¬M= E and ¬E= M).
The choice conjunction applied to games A, B produces the following game A  B . First, Environment decides between A
and B . Then the chosen game is played. If Environment has not decided, it loses. Formally a non-empty run is legal iff it
starts with Environment’s move “choose left” or “choose right” and the rest of the run is a legal run of A if the ﬁrst move
is “choose left” and is a legal run of B if the ﬁrst move is “choose right”. A legal run is won by Machine in the following
5 Called a constant game in [6].
I. Mezhirov, N. Vereshchagin / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 76 (2010) 356–372 365three cases: (1) it is empty, (2) the ﬁrst move is “choose left” and the rest of the run is won by Machine in the game A,
and (3) the ﬁrst move is “choose right” and the rest of the run is won by Machine in the game B .
The choice disjunction A unionsq B of A, B is dual to A  B . This time Machine has to decide between A and B (and it loses if
it has not decided). In other words, A unionsq B = ¬(¬A  ¬B).
Parallel disjunction ∨. In the game A ∨ B the players play two games A and B simultaneously. In order to win, Machine
has to win at least one game. Formally, a run Γ is legal if the following holds. Let Γ i denote the result of removing from Γ
all the labmoves that do not have the form P i.α (where P = E,M) and replacing the preﬁx P i.α by Pα in all the remaining
labmoves. A run Γ is legal if every its labmove has the form P i.α (where i = 1,2) and the runs Γ 1, Γ 2 are legal runs of
A, B , respectively. Such a run is won by Machine if either Γ 1 is won by Machine in A or Γ 2 is won by Machine in B (or
both).
Parallel conjunction ∧ is dual to parallel disjunction. The difference is that this time Machine has to win both games. In
other words, A ∧ B = ¬(¬A ∨ ¬B).
Parallel recurrence ∧| . The game ∧| A is essentially an inﬁnite parallel conjunction A ∧ A ∧ A ∧ . . . . Players play simultane-
ously an inﬁnite number of plays and in order to win Machine has to win all plays. Formally, a run is legal if all its labmoves
have the form P i.α where i = 1,2,3, . . . (we spell natural numbers in decimal notation, say) and all Γ 1,Γ 2,Γ 3, . . . are legal
runs of A. Such a run is won by Machine if all Γ i are won by Machine in the game A.
Parallel corecurrence ∨| is dual to parallel recurrence ∧| . Again players play inﬁnitely many plays in the game A. However,
this time in order to win, Machine has to win at least one play. That is, ∨| A = ¬(∧| ¬A).
All these operations preserve the static property. However not all of them preserve strictness property. Consider, for
example, the multiplicative conjunction. Assume that the games A and B are strict, the ﬁrst move in A is made by Environ-
ment and the ﬁrst move in B is made by Machine. Then the ﬁrst move in A ∧ B can be made by either player. Nevertheless
all eight ways to play A ∧ B are equivalent (for all strict games A, B). So we could ﬁx any of the eight ways to play and
thus convert A ∧ B into an equivalent strict game. However such stipulating would be quite unnatural (bureaucratic, using
Japaridze’s word). As a result, we would not have the property A ∧ B = ¬(¬A ∨ ¬B). The games A ∧ B and ¬(¬A ∨ ¬B)
would be only equivalent in a sense.
Another reason to prefer static games is that all the computational problems can be quite naturally expressed as static
games and not as strict games (see [13] for many examples). That is why Japaridze has chosen static games as a basis for
his Game semantics.
2.3. Winnable = accomplishable
There is a similarity between operations on static games and abstract resource semantics. Consider, for instance, a for-
mula A unionsq B and a static game G unionsq H . Machine has won G unionsq H if it has made a choice between G and H and has won the
chosen game. Similarly, Alice has won A unionsq B if she has chosen between A and B and has won the chosen formula. The same
holds for all connectives. The following lemma expresses this similarity in a rigorous form.
Let A(x1, . . . , xn) be a formula and G1, . . . ,Gn static games. Substituting Gi for xi in A and performing all operations
spelled in A, we obtain a static game A(G1, . . . ,Gn). Exponential AND and OR are interpreted as ∧| ,∨| respectively. Let R be
a run in the game [A] and S a run in the game A(G1, . . . ,Gn). Let P1 (choose B1), P2 (choose B2), . . . be the sequence of
all the choice moves made in R . Call R and S similar if the sequence of all the choice moves in S is equal to P ′1 (choose
B1(G1, . . . ,Gn)), P ′2 (choose B2(G1, . . . ,Gn)), . . . where Bi(G1, . . . ,Gn) is the sub-game of A(G1, . . . ,Gn) corresponding to
the oformula Bi and Alice ′ = Machine, Bob′ = Environment. The following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 7. Let R and S be similar runs. Consider the following ovariable evaluation: an occurrence of pi is true iff Machine has won the
corresponding occurrence of Gi .6 Then Machine has won S iff Alice has won R for this evaluation.
We say that a formula A is winnable, if for all static games G1, . . . ,Gn the resulting game A(G1, . . . ,Gn) is winnable. We
say that A is computably winnable, if for all static games G1, . . . ,Gn the game A(G1, . . . ,Gn) is computably winnable.
Consider also the uniform version of winnability. Call a formula A is uniformly (computably) winnable, if there is a
(computable) strategy winning the game A(G1, . . . ,Gn) for all static games G1, . . . ,Gn .
Every static game is equivalent to a strict game. Thus, in the deﬁnition of winnability we may restrict ourselves to strict
games. On the other hand, if we consider only determined games7 we obtain a weaker notion. Why? The class of determined
games is closed under all operations considered. And who wins the game is determined just classically: Machine wins (i.e.,
it has a winning strategy in) A ∧ B iff it wins A and wins B , Machine wins A ∨ B if it wins A or wins B etc. Thus, if we
restrict the class of static games to determined ones, a formula is winnable iff after dropping exponentials and identifying
multiplicative and additive connectives it becomes a classical tautology.
For uniform winnability and computable winnability this is not the case. For example, it might be that Machine has a
computable winning strategy in the game A ∨ B but does not have computable winning strategy in either A or B . Therefore
6 More precisely, the player who has played that copy of Gi in Machine’s part has won it.
7 The game is called determined in either Machine, or Environment has a winning strategy in the game.
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out that this restriction does not affect the classes of uniformly winnable and uniformly computably winnable formulae. We
do not know whether this is true for computably winnable formulae.
Theorem 8. The following three properties of a formula A are equivalent:
(1) A is computably accomplishable,
(2) A is uniformly computably winnable,
(3) there is computable strategy that wins every game A(G1, . . . ,Gn) where G1, . . . ,Gn are 2-move8 strict games.
Proof. 9 It is straightforward that (2) ⇒ (3).
Proof of (1) ⇒ (2). Assume that Alice has a computable winning strategy S in the game [A]. We have to show that
Machine has a computable winning strategy that wins every game of the form A(G1, . . . ,Gn).
For every sub-formula B of A consider the “sub-game” B(G1, . . . ,Gn) of A(G1, . . . ,Gn). If B has the form C unionsq D or C  D
then every choice between C and D corresponds to a choice move between C(G1, . . . ,Gn) and D(G1, . . . ,Gn) in the game
A(G1, . . . ,Gn). Thus we have 1-1 correspondence between choice moves in the game [A] and choice moves in the game
A(G1, . . . ,Gn). To every occurrence p
j
k of the variable pk in A corresponds a sub-game Gk of A(G1, . . . ,Gn), which will be
called G jk .
We will now construct Machine’s winning strategy. While playing A(G1, . . . ,Gn) Machine plays in its mind an imaginary
game [A], where it applies the strategy S for Alice and makes certain moves for Bob. More speciﬁcally, all the choices made
by Environment in the game A(G1, . . . ,Gn) are mimicked immediately in the game [A], as Bob’s moves, and, conversely,
all choices that S has made in [A] are mimicked immediately in A(G1, . . . ,Gn). Thus, after every Machine’s move, all the
choices made in the real and imaginary games are identical.
Besides, if S on a certain move has allocated ¬p jk to pmk , Machine starts from that time the “synchronisation” of the
games G jk and G
m
k . The latter means that it mimics in G
j
k all Environment’s moves made in G
m
k , and vice versa. This is
indeed possible, as Machine plays G jk in Environment’s part. Thus, starting from the time of that allocation, after every
Machine’s move, the current position Γ mk in G
m
k is a Machine-delay of the current position Γ
j
k in G
j
k .
10 Hence, when the
game is played, the run Γ mk is a Machine-delay of the run Γ
j
k .
We have to prove that the constructed Machine’s strategy S ′ wins the game A(G1, . . . ,Gn). Fix Environment’s moves
against S ′ . We obtain a run Γ ′ played against S ′ and the corresponding imaginary run Γ played against S . As S is a
winning strategy, the imaginary run Γ is won by Alice. Therefore for every correct ovariable evaluation Alice has won the
formula A.
Let us choose the following ovariable evaluation. Let Γ li stand for the run in the sub-game G
l
i . If the run Γ
l
i is Machine
won (that is, WGi (Γ
l
i ) = M) then declare pli true, and otherwise false. We need to show that this evaluation is correct.
Assume that a negative ovariable p jk has been allocated to a positive ovariable p
m
k , and thus the games G
j
k and G
m
k were
synchronised. If WGk (Γ
j
k ) = M then, as Gk is a static game, WGk (Γ mk ) = M, as well. It may happen however that WGk (Γ jk ) = E
and WGk (Γ
m
k ) = M (that is, Machine has won both games ¬G jk and Gmk ). In this case we have declared p jk false and pmk true
and thus the ovariable evaluation is incorrect. But the incorrectness is in favour of Alice (as all connectives are monotone)
and hence Alice has won A for this ovariable evaluation. By Lemma 7 Machine has won the run Γ ′ , and we are done.
We will show now that, conversely, the negation of (1) implies the negation of (3). Let us ﬁx a formula A(p1, . . . , pn)
which is not computably accomplishable and a computable Machine’s strategy S . We have to deﬁne strict 2-move games
G1, . . . ,Gn such that S loses the game A(G1, . . . ,Gn). The ﬁrst move x in all G1, . . . ,Gn must be made by Machine and the
second move y must be made by Environment. Machine wins Gi iff either it has made the ﬁrst move but Environment has
not made the second move, or both moves x, y has been played and the pair (x, y) belongs to a certain set Wi . Thus we
have to deﬁne W1, . . . ,Wn .
To every copy p jk of pk in A corresponds a game Gk inside A(G1, . . . ,Gn), which will be called G
j
k . We will ﬁx now
how Environment plays the games G jk against S . If p
j
k is negative then Environment has to make the ﬁrst move in G
j
k and
otherwise the second move. Anyway, once it should move it plays j in G jk (we identify strings over the keyboard alphabet
and natural numbers). If there are inﬁnitely many negative occurrences of pk , then Environment makes the moves in them
in some order so that by the end of the play all these moves have been made (say at time j it makes the move in ¬G jk).
8 We call a game a k-move game, if every legal run has at most k labmoves.
9 Morally, this proof is similar to soundness/completeness proof for system CL2 in [9]. Although the syntax of CL2 does not include parallel recurrences,
those are long ∨,∧ after all.
10 Formally, Γ mk and Γ
j
k are deﬁned as follows. It is easy to extract from the current position in the game A(G1, . . . ,Gn) the sequence of labmoves “made
in Gmk ”. That sequence is Γ
m
k . To obtain Γ
i
k we ﬁrst extract from the current position the sequence of labmoves  made in ¬G jk and then let Γ ik = ¬.
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m
k a collision, if for some x, y, in both games, the ﬁrst move is x and the second move is y.
Environment’s strategy guarantees that in this case p jk is negative and p
m
k is positive and x = j, y = m (or vice versa). In
particular, for every j there is at most one m such that G jk,G
m
k is a collision and, conversely, for every m there is at most
one such j.
Now we have to deﬁne Environment’s choices in the game A(G1, . . . ,Gn) and the sets W1, . . . ,Wk . To this end consider
the following Alice’s strategy S ′ to play the game [A]. The strategy keeps an imaginary position in the game A(G1, . . . ,Gn)
(at the start it keeps the initial position). In her turn Alice: (a) mimics in the imaginary play A(G1, . . . ,Gn) all choices
made by Bob on the last move in [A], (b) makes moves in copies of G1, . . . ,Gn , as described above, (c) applies Machine’s
strategy S to the resulting position (items (a)–(c) are done in Alice’s mind, they do not affect immediately the real game);
(d) mimics in [A] all choices made by S in A(G1, . . . ,Gn), (e) makes allocation as follows: Alice allocates p jk to pmk , if the
pair G jk,G
m
k has become a collision. As we have noticed, these allocations obey the rules of the game.
This strategy S ′ is computable. Therefore, Bob can play so that Alice has lost the game [A]. Fix such Bob’s moves and
make these moves against S ′ in the imaginary play. Mimicking them in the real play, we will obtain Environment’s moves
in A(G1, . . . ,Gn).
It remains to deﬁne W1, . . . ,Wn . Fix a correct ovariable evaluation e such that Alice has lost the formula [A]. Let Γ jk
be the sequence of moves played in G jk . Let Wk(Γ
j
k ) = M iff p jk is true. Environment’s strategy guarantees the following. If
Γ
j
k = Γ mk (for j =m) then G jk,Gmk is a collision. Thus Alice has allocated p jk to pmk and hence e(p jk) = e(pmk ). This shows that
W1, . . . ,Wn are well deﬁned. By Lemma 7 Machine has won A(G1, . . . ,Gn) iff Alice has won A for this evaluation, and we
are done. 
In [6] Japaridze conjectures that computable winnability coincides with uniform computable winnability (Conjec-
ture 26.1). In the preliminary version of this paper [16] we claimed, without a proof, that this conjecture is true. We have
to admit that we have no valid proof for this. However, if we drop the computability requirement, then uniform winnability
coincides with the non-uniform one.
Theorem 9. The following four properties of a formula A are equivalent:
(1) A is accomplishable.
(2) A is uniformly winnable.
(3) A is winnable.
(4) There is a Machine’s strategy winning every game of the form A(G1, . . . ,Gn), where G1, . . . ,Gn are 2-move strict games.
Proof. It is straightforward that (2) ⇒ (3) and (2) ⇒ (4). To prove the implication (1) ⇒ (2) recall the following. In the
proof of the implication (1) ⇒ (2) from Theorem 8, we transformed every Alice’s strategy S that wins [A] to a strategy
S ′ that wins A(G1, . . . ,Gn) for all static games G1, . . . ,Gn . (That transformation preserves computability, which does not
matter any more.)
The proof of ¬(1) ⇒ ¬(4). In the proof of the implication ¬(1) ⇒ ¬(3) in Theorem 8 we have constructed a transforma-
tion S → S ′ from Machine’s strategies in the game A(G1, . . . ,Gn) to Alice’s strategies in [A] that has the following property.
If S ′ does not win A then there are 2-move strict games G1, . . . ,Gn such that S does not win A(G1, . . . ,Gn). This shows
¬(1) ⇒ ¬(4).
The proof of the implication ¬(1) ⇒ ¬(3) is similar to the proof of ¬(1) ⇒ ¬(3) in Theorem 8. However, this time we
have to beat uncountably many strategies (and not one strategy) and we need indetermined games G1, . . . ,Gn .
Assume that A is not accomplishable. We will deﬁne strict games G1, . . . ,Gn so that Machine has no winning strategy
in the game A(G1, . . . ,Gn). The turn of move in the games G1, . . . ,Gn will alternate, starting with Environment, say, and all
moves made in turn will be legal. If the run is ﬁnite then it is lost by that player who has turn to move. Thus we have to
deﬁne the value of winning functions W1, . . . ,Wn on inﬁnite runs.
We will use diagonal arguments. There are continuum strategies in static games. Indeed, a strategy is a mapping from
the set of all positions into to the set of all moves joint with “pass” (we assume the following playing mode: in its turn,
each player either makes a move or passes). The set of all positions is countable, as a countable union of countable sets (for
every ﬁxed k, the set of all positions consisting of k moves is countable, as a product of countable sets). Finally, there are
continuum mappings from N to N, as
∣
∣NN
∣
∣
(
2N
)N = 2|N×N| = 2|N| = c.
Let us ﬁx a 1-1 mapping from the ordinal c to the set of all strategies. The strategy assigned to α ∈ c will be called Sα . We
will use transﬁnite recursion on ordinals in c. On step α we will deﬁne Environment’s moves against Sα and we will deﬁne
W1, . . . ,Wn on countably many runs. Thus, before step α, W1, . . . ,Wn will be deﬁned on less than c runs.
368 I. Mezhirov, N. Vereshchagin / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 76 (2010) 356–372Step α. As W1, . . . ,Wn have been deﬁned so far on less than c runs, there is a sequence of moves a1,a2, . . . that has the
following property. For all i  n, Wi has not been deﬁned on any run of the form
∗,∗,E.a1,∗,E.a2,∗,E.a3,∗, . . .
and on any run of the form
∗,∗,∗,M.a1,∗,M.a2,∗,M.a3, . . . .
We ﬁx now Environment’s moves in the game A(G1, . . . ,Gn). In the copy G
j
k of Gk Environment plays j and then
a1,a2, . . . . This applies for both negative and positive occurrences of pk . By the choice of a1,a2, . . . , whatever moves Ma-
chine makes in G jk , the resulting run Γ
j
k either is ﬁnite (and hence lost by Machine), or it is inﬁnite and Wk has not been
deﬁned on Γ jk on previous steps. So we are free to deﬁne the value of Wk on every inﬁnite resulting run. The only con-
straint is that there might be collisions: a collision is a pair G jk,G
m
k such that the runs Γ
j
k ,Γ
m
k coincide. This may happen
only if p jk is negative and p
m
k is positive (or vice versa). In this case both Γ
j
k ,Γ
m
k start with j,m (or m, j) and Environment
can see when it happens after Machine has made its ﬁrst moves in both G jk,G
m
k .
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of ¬(1) ⇒ ¬(3) in Theorem 8. We ﬁrst deﬁne Alice’s strategy S ′α in [A]. In
her turn Alice: (a) mimics in the imaginary play A(G1, . . . ,Gn) all choices made by Bob on the last move in [A], (b) makes
moves in copies of G1, . . . ,Gn , as described above, (c) applies Machine’s strategy Sα to the resulting position; (d) mimics
in [A] all choices made by Sα in A(G1, . . . ,Gn), (e) allocates p jk to pmk , if the ﬁrst two moves in G jk,Gmk have been made
and they coincide.
As S ′α does not win [A], there are Bob’s moves such that S ′α has lost [A]. Fix such moves. Mimicking them in the game
A(G1, . . . ,Gn) we obtain Environment choice moves against Sα . Thus all Environment’s moves against Sα are ﬁxed. As the
formula A has been lost by Alice, we can deﬁne W1, . . . ,Wn on all resulting runs so that Machine has lost A(G1, . . . ,Gn).
Notice that we have deﬁned W1, . . . ,Wn on at most countably many runs. 
A sequent is called (uniformly) (computably) winnable if so is its formula image. Theorems 8 and 9 show that winnability
is a sound semantics for aﬃne logic.
Theorem 10. The set of winnable sequents contains all axioms of the aﬃne logic and is closed under all its derivation rules and
under the substitution. The same applies to uniformly winnable sequents, computably winnable sequents, and uniformly computably
winnable sequents. (Hence all derivable formulae are uniformly computably winnable.)
Proof. For winnability the statement is true, since winnability coincides with accomplishability. The same applies to uniform
winnability and uniform computable winnability. For computable winnability this is proved similar to Theorems 1 and 2. 
Remark 11. The soundness of aﬃne logic with respect to computable uniform winnability (and hence all other sorts of
winnabilities) was shown in [13].
This theorem together with Theorem 4 and Lemma 3 show that winnability is a sound game theoretic semantics for
intuitionistic propositional calculus, which is complete for its positive fragment.
Corollary 12. Let A be a formula in the intuitionistic language. If A is provable in IPC then the formula A∗ is uniformly computable
winnable. Conversely, if A is positive and non-provable in IPC then A∗ is not winnable and A∗ is not uniformly winnable for 2-move
strict games (corollary of Theorem 9).
What about non-uniform computable winnability for k-move and determined games? The second item of Corollary 12
does not imply that there are determined games G1, . . . ,Gn such that the game A∗(G1, . . . ,Gn) is not computably winnable.
Theorem 13. If a positive formula A is not provable in IPC then there are determined static games G1, . . . ,Gn such that the game
A∗(G1, . . . ,Gn) is not computably winnable.
Proof. Let L stand for the set of all formulae such that for all determined static games G1, . . . ,Gn the game A∗(G1, . . . ,Gn)
is computably winnable. All operations on static games used in Girard’s translation preserve determinacy. Thus L is a super-
intuitionistic logic (the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3). By Theorem 5, it suﬃces to prove that L contains no
critical implications.
Let A be a critical implication. We have to ﬁnd determined static games G1, . . . ,Gn such that A(G1, . . . ,Gn) is not
computably winnable. All the games G1, . . . ,Gn will have the form “produce a binary sequence f ”, where f : N→ {0,1}.
More speciﬁcally, we will deﬁne sequences f1, . . . , fn and Gi will be the following strict game: a run is legal in Gi if it
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xt = f i(t) for all t = 0,1,2, . . . . Obviously, whatever functions f1, . . . , fn we choose later, the games G1, . . . ,Gn will be
determined (won by Machine).
It is not hard to prove that there are functions f1, . . . , fn such that every f i is not Turing reducible to the tuple consisting
of f1, . . . , f i−1, f i+1, . . . , fn . That is, there is no Turing machine that computes f i given an oracle that is able to compute all
functions f1, . . . , f i−1, f i+1, . . . , fn . Fix such tuple of functions f1, . . . , fn .
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4. That is, Environment applies Bob’s strategy, as deﬁned there.
Besides it plays in the copies of games G1, . . . ,Gn as follows. In every sub-game of the form ¬Gi (where Environment has
to make moves) it plays f i(0), f i(1), . . . . It plays ¬G1, . . . ,¬Gn in this way until Machine has made a choice in G1 unionsq · · ·unionsqGn .
Starting from that time, it stops making any moves in all the sub-games ¬G j , where G j is the game chosen by Machine
(and keeps playing in Gi for i = j).
We will show now that Environment wins. Assume ﬁrst that Machine has not made a choice in the game G1 unionsq · · · unionsq Gn .
Then W1, . . . ,Wn evaluate to M on the runs in all copies of G1, . . . ,Gn that correspond to negative ocurrences of p1, . . . , pn .
Even if W1, . . . ,Wn evaluate to M on all runs corresponding to positive ocurrences of p1, . . . , pn , Environment wins. Indeed,
by Lemma 7 Machine has won the game A(G1, . . . ,Gn) iff Alice has won the formula A for the similar run in the game [A]
and for the evaluation that makes true all ovariables. As shown in the proof of Theorem 4, Alice has lost the similar run in
the game [A] for this ovariable evaluation.
Assume that Machine has made a choice in the game G1 unionsq · · · unionsq Gn and has chosen, say, G j . Again W1, . . . ,Wn evaluate
to M on the runs in all copies of G1, . . . ,G j−1,G j+1, . . . ,Gn that correspond to negative ocurrences of p1, . . . , pn . Let us
prove that W j evaluates to E on all the runs in copies of G j corresponding to positive copies of p j . Indeed, Environment
has ceased to provide any information about f j . Thus Machine’s playing G j can be viewed as a computation of f j with
oracles for f1, . . . , f j−1, f j+1, . . . , fn . As any such computation makes an error, Machine has lost every positive copy of G j .
Again by Lemma 7 and arguments similar to those from Theorem 4, Machine has lost the game A(G1, . . . ,Gn). 
2.4. Countable branching recurrence
There is another way to interpret exponential connectives as operations on games, called branching recurrence and
corecurrence in [13]. There are two versions of them, countable and uncountable. Countable branching recurrence and core-
currence were essentially introduced by Blass in [1]. In the present form, they were deﬁned in [12].
The countable branching recurrence ◦|ℵ0 is the operation on games deﬁned as follows. In the game ◦|ℵ0 A players play
countably many plays in the game A and Machine has to win all plays (like in the game ∧| A). However this time its job is
even more diﬃcult, as Environment may “copy” positions. Informally, we can imagine that a position in the game ◦|ℵ0 A is a
tuple 〈p1, . . . , pn〉 of positions of A. The initial position is the tuple 〈p1〉 where p1 is the initial position in A. If the current
position is 〈p1, . . . , pn〉, then each player is allowed to make a legal move in any of the positions p1, . . . , pn . Environment
is also allowed to copy any pi , in which case the new position is equal to 〈p1, . . . , pn, pi〉.
This deﬁnition is very informal because we have deﬁned moves in terms of positions and not the other way around, as
our framework prescribes.
Moreover, the described game may be not static.11 To obtain an equivalent static game we need to understand a copying
operation as splitting one position (the parent) into two new positions (the children). If a move made in a position P at
time t is postponed to time t′ > t and by the time t′ the position P has been split, then that move is automatically played
in all descendants of P . More speciﬁcally, we assign to each position an address, which is a binary string rather than a
natural number. When a position with address w is split, the children positions get addresses w0 and w1. When a play is
ﬁnished we obtain a ﬁnite or inﬁnite tree consisting of all addresses used. All leaves in that tree are addresses of the played
games. If the tree is inﬁnite then some inﬁnite paths are also addresses of played games: those inﬁnite paths which have
ﬁnite number of 1s. We will call such inﬁnite binary sequences bounded.
Formally, a run Γ is legal if it is a sequence of labmoves of the form Pw.α and E(split w) having the following two
properties. (1) For every w and every proper preﬁx u of w every occurrence of a labmove of the form Pw.α or E(split w)
in Γ is preceded by exactly one occurrence of the labmove E(split u). (2) For every ﬁnite or inﬁnite binary sequence w
consider the sequence Γ (w) of all labmoves in Γ of the form Pu.α—with “u.” removed—where u is a preﬁx of w . For each
ﬁnite or inﬁnite w the run Γ (w) must be a legal run of A. A legal run Γ is won by Machine if Γ (w) is won by Machine
for all leaves w and all bounded inﬁnite branches w .
In the deﬁnition of uncountable branching recurrence ◦| , we stipulate that Γ is won by Machine if Γ (w) is won for all
leaves w and for all inﬁnite branches w (and not only bounded). Thus the difference between countable and uncountable
versions is due to different understandings which plays in G have been played in the course of a play in ◦| G .
Countable branching corecurrence ◦|ℵ0 is deﬁned in the dual way so that ◦|ℵ0 A = ¬(◦|ℵ0¬A). Let us change the interpretation
of ! and ? to ◦|ℵ0 and ◦|ℵ0 , respectively. We obtain new notions of winnability and computable winnability, which does not
coincide with the old ones.
11 Indeed, assume that the initial position is lost by Machine and every run of length 1 is won by Machine. Then the position M1.α,E.(copy position 1) is
won by Machine but the position E.(copy position 1),M1.α is lost.
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?(¬x  ¬y) ∨ (! x unionsq ! y),
is (1) not winnable if exponentials are interpreted as parallel recurrence and corecurrence but is (2) uniformly computably winnable
provided exponentials are interpreted as countable branching recurrence and corecurrence.
Proof. (1) As winnability for parallel recurrence and corecurrence coincides with accomplishability, it suﬃces to prove that
the formula is not accomplishable. Here is Bob’s winning strategy. Bob starts choosing ¬x in all occurrences of ¬x¬y (one
choice per move). He goes on until Alice has made a choice in ! x unionsq ! y. If Alice has chosen ! y, then she will lose the game,
as Bob can declare all y’s false and all x’s true. Otherwise (if Alice has chosen ! x), Bob stops choosing ¬x in remaining
oformulae ¬x  ¬y and starts choosing ¬y instead. Again Bob has won, as he can declare true all ovariables he has chosen
and declare all others false.
(2) Let G, H be any static games. Here is Machine’s computable winning strategy in the game
?(¬G  ¬H) ∨ (!G unionsq ! H),
Machine waits until Environment makes a choice between ¬G and ¬H in the initial position of ¬G  ¬H . W.l.o.g. assume
that it has chosen ¬G . Then Machine chooses !G in !G unionsq ! H . Thus the game has basically become ?¬G ∨ !G starting in
its initial position. Indeed, when Machine splits a position in the game ?(¬G  ¬H) in two positions, the choice made by
Bob automatically applies to both children-positions. As the formula ?¬x∨ ! x is derivable in the aﬃne logic, Machine has a
computable winning strategy in the game ?¬G ∨ !G . 
Theorem 15. The set of winnable sequents (exponentials are interpreted as countable branching recurrence and corecurrence) contains
all axioms of the aﬃne logic and is closed under all its derivation rules and under the substitution. The same applies to uniformly
winnable sequents, computably winnable sequents, and uniformly computably winnable sequents. (Hence all derivable formulae are
uniformly computably winnable.)
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1. 
Theorems 8 and 9 remain valid for the new notions of winnability:
Theorem 16. The following two properties of a formula A are equivalent (if exponentials are interpreted as countable branching
recurrence and corecurrence):
(1) A is uniformly computably winnable.
(2) There is a computable strategy winning every game A(G1, . . . ,Gn) where G1, . . . ,Gn are 2-move strict games.
Theorem 17. The following three properties of a formula A are equivalent (if exponentials are interpreted as countable branching
recurrence and corecurrence):
(1) A is uniformly winnable.
(2) A is winnable.
(3) There is a Machine’s strategy winning every game of the form A(G1, . . . ,Gn), where G1, . . . ,Gn are 2-move strict games.
Proof of Theorem 16. Obviously (1) implies (2).
One can prove the reverse implication along the same lines as in Theorem 8: we can change the deﬁnition of the game
[A] so that both (1) and (2) are equivalent to existence of a computable winning strategy in [A]. However the new notion
of accomplishability has no independent interest so we will prove the implication (2) ⇒ (1) directly.
Assume that (1) is false and ﬁx a computable Machine’s strategy S in A(G1, . . . ,Gn). We have to deﬁne 2-move strict
games G1, . . . ,Gn such that S loses A(G1, . . . ,Gn). The ﬁrst move in all G1, . . . ,Gn is played by Machine and the second one
by Environment. Let Environment play j in G jk once it has turn to move in G
j
k . This ensures that for every j there is at most
one m such that (G jk,G
m
k ) is a collision (the runs in G
j
k and G
m
k coincide). We need to deﬁne choice moves of Environment
and the winning conditions in the games G1, . . . ,Gn so that Environment wins.
To this end consider another strategy S ′ to play A(H1, . . . , Hn). The strategy S ′ plays the real game A(H1, . . . , Hn)
simultaneously with an imaginary game A(G1, . . . ,Gn). In its turn S ′: (a) mimics in the imaginary play A(G1, . . . ,Gn) all
choices and copy moves made by Environment on the last move in A(H1, . . . , Hn), (b) makes moves in copies of G1, . . . ,Gn ,
as described above, (c) applies S to the resulting position; (d) mimics in A(H1, . . . , Hn) all choices and copy moves made
by S in A(G1, . . . ,Gn), (e) starts synchronising H
j
k and H
m
k , if G
m
k ,G
j
k has become a collision.
As S ′ is computable, there are static games H1, . . . , Hn and Environment’s moves in A(H1, . . . , Hn) such that S ′ has lost
A(H1, . . . , Hn). Mimicking choices and copy moves in A(G1, . . . ,Gn) we obtain Environment’s choices and copy moves in
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j
k iff Machine has won H
j
k . The game
Gk is well deﬁned. Indeed, if the run in G
j
k and G
m
k coincide then H
j
k and H
m
k were synchronized and hence the runs in H
j
k
and Hmk coincide as well. 
Proof of Theorem 17. It is straightforward that (1) ⇒ (2) and (1) ⇒ (3). The implication (3) ⇒ (1) was basically proved in
the proof of Theorem 16. Indeed, we have deﬁned a transformation of every strategy S to a strategy S ′ and a transformation
of every tuple of games H1, . . . , Hn to 2-move strict games G1, . . . ,Gn such that the following holds. If S ′ does not win
A(H1, . . . , Hn) then S does not win A(G1, . . . ,Gn).
The proof of implication ¬(1) ⇒ ¬(2) is entirely similar to the proof of ¬(1) ⇒ ¬(3) in Theorem 9 and therefore we
omit it. 
Corollary 12 remains true for countable branching recurrence and corecurrence and, moreover, in the translation of A∨ B
we may omit !. More speciﬁcally, let (xi)† = xi and
(A ∨ B)† = A† unionsq B†, (A ∧ B)† = A†  B†,
(A → B)† = ¬(! A†) ∨ B† = ?(¬A†) ∨ B†, ⊥† = 0.
Theorem 18. The set of all formulae A such that A† is winnable is a super-intuitionistic logic (if exponentials are interpreted as
countable branching recurrence and corecurrence). The same holds for computable winnability, and uniform versions of winnability
and computable winnability. On the other hand, if a positive formula is not provable in IPC then the formula A† is not winnable and
there are determined static games such that the game A†(G1, . . . ,Gn) is not computably winnable.
Proof. It is easy to verify that translations of all axioms of IPC are uniformly computably winnable, except for the axiom
A = (x → z) → ((y → z) → (x∨ y → z)).
The translation of the latter is equal to
A† = ?(! x∧ ¬z) ∨ ?(! y ∧ ¬z) ∨ ?(¬x  ¬y) ∨ z.
The formula A† is not derivable in the aﬃne logic, as it is not accomplishable. However it is uniformly computably winnable
(if exponentials are interpreted as countable branching recurrence and corecurrence). Indeed, by Lemma 14 the formula
B = ?(¬x  ¬y) ∨ (! x unionsq ! y)
is uniformly computably winnable. It is easy to verify that the sequent 
 ¬B ∨ A† is derivable in the aﬃne logic. Hence
it is uniformly computably winnable. The sequent 
 A† follows from 
 ¬B ∨ A† and 
 B by Cut, and hence is uniformly
computably winnable as well.
Thus translations of all axioms of IPC are uniformly computably winnable. The closure under Substitution and Modus
ponens is proved similar to Theorem 1. The second part of the theorem is proved similar to Theorems 4 and 13. 
Theorem 18 is true for the Girard’s translation as well, and the proof is similar.
2.5. Historical and terminological remarks
The notions of a computably winnable and uniformly computably winnable formula were deﬁned in [6] under the
name a (uniformly) valid formula. The uncomputable versions of these were also considered in [6], as a property of games
rather than a property of formulae. The notion of a winnable formula (only for countable branching recurrence) was ﬁrst
considered by Blass in [2]. Although Blass has considered only strict games and his deﬁnition of a countable branching
recurrence differs in some technical details from the above deﬁnition, the class of winnable formulae is the same.
2.6. Uncountable branching recurrence
Theorem 18 is true for uncountable branching recurrence as well, which was shown in [10]. Our proof of Theorem 18
(based on Theorem 5) also works for uncountable branching recurrence and corecurrence and provides a shorter proof than
that of [10].
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